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"' 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MADSONIA REALTY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
ZION'S SAYINGS BANK & TRUST 
CO:JIP ANY, a corporation, as ex-
ecutor of the Estate of Richard W. 
:Jiadsen, deceased, and LARETA C. 
:MADSEN, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 7589 
BRIEF OF PLAIN·TIFF AND RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts by appellants (pp. 1-7) is 
correct but incomplete. Appellants do not dispute or com-
plain of any of the findings of the trial court and we 
believe a more complete statement of the issues framed 
by the pleadings and facts as found by that Court will 
facilitate the work of this Honorable Court. 
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This case was commenced by the filing of a '' Peti-
tion for Order Directing E~ecutor to Execute Deed" in 
the Probate Division of the District Court in the matter 
of the Estate of Richard W. Madsen, Deceased. The only 
relief prayed was that Zion's Savings Bank & Trust 
Company, as E~ecutor of the Estate of Richard W. Mad-
sen, deceased, execute and deliver to Madsonia Realty 
Company a deed to certain property which had been 
bought and paid for hy Madsonia Realty Company. 
LaReta C. Madsen intervened and filed a demurrer to 
the petition. She acted in her individual capacity as an 
heir and widow and not for or on behalf of the executor. 
The executor also filed an answer to the petition. The 
demurrer of LaReta C. Madsen was overruled and she 
filed an answer and counterclaim to the petition. The 
petitioner, Madsonia Realty Company, filed a reply 
joining issue with LaReta G. Madsen on her claim to a 
dower interest in the real estate or an interest in the pro-
ceeds from the sale. The case was transferred to the civil 
division of the court, given a civil number ( 87361) and a 
fee was paid by the rpJaintiff as in the case of filing an 
original civil action. The case was then designated 
"Madsonia Realty Company, Plaintiff, vs. Zion's Sav-
ings Bank & T'rust Company and La Reta C. Madsen, 
Defendants'' and was thereafter treated in all respects as 
a civil action rather than a petition in probate. 
The Madsonia Realty Company is a corporation 
which was organized in 1923 ( R. 71, Finding No. 1). R. 
W. Madsen had been previously married and his first 
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wife died in 1932 (R. 182). R. W. Madsen and LaReta 
C. :Jiadsen, the widow of the deceased, were married 
October 30, 1935 (R. 71, Finding No. 3). At the time of 
the second marriage, R. W. ~Iadsen owned the property 
at 667 East 1st South Street in Salt Lake City which had 
been his family residence (R. 71, Finding No. 4). On 
January 31, 1937, R. \V. :Madsen sold the property in 
question to :Jiadsonia Realty Company for $10,680.00 
(R. 71, Finding No. 5). The consideration for said prop-
erty was paid to R. W. :Madsen, but no deed was ever 
executed by him to the corporation (R. 71, Finding No. 
5). From the date of sale until the death of R. W. Madsen 
the property was treated in all respects by him and by 
1fadsonia Realty Company as the property of the com-
pany. 'The specific acts regarding ownership of the prop-
erty by Madsonia are : 
(a) The sale was entered on the books of 
the corporation in the handwriting of R. W. Mad-
sen, President and General lVIanager of the cor-
poration (R. 71, Finding No.5). 
(b) From that date until June 6, 1946, all 
rents were collected by the corporation and 
Madsonia Realty Company paid all taxes, upkeep 
and repairs on the property (R. 71, 72, Finding 
No.5). 
(c) On June 6, 1946, the property was sold 
to James 0. Peterson and C. Amelia Peterson for 
$16,500.00. While the contract of sale was signed 
by R. W. Madsen and his wife, LaReta, as sellers, 
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"said Richard W. Madsen was in fact acting for 
and on behalf of Madsonia Realty Company in the 
signing of said contract of sale" (R. 72, Finding 
No.6). 
(d)· This sale was also entered on the books 
of Madsonia Realty Company in the handwriting 
of R. W. Madsen and the $4,000.00 down payment 
was entered as a credit to the buyers on the books 
of such corporation (R. 72, Finding No.6). 
(e) Madsonia Realty Company showed a 
profit on its books at the time of the sale of $9,-
428.49 (R: 72, Finding No. 6). (The excess in 
profit over the actual difference between the pur-
chase price and the sale [$16,500.00-----$10,680.00= 
$5,820.00] is accounted for by depreciation which 
had been entered on the books). 
(f) This profit was. reported by Madsonia 
on state and federal income tax returns for the 
year 1946 and the taxes paid (R. 72, Finding No. 
6, R.187, Exh. T., U., Wand X). 
(g) All payments on the contract made by 
the Petersons and their successors in interest were 
deposited to the account of Madsonia and entered 
on its books, this being done personally by R. W. 
Madsen (R. 72, Finding No.6). 
Subsequent to the death of R. W. Madsen the pay-
ments were made direct by the purchasers to Madsonia 
Realty Company (R. 72, 73, Finding No.6). 
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La.Reta C. ~Iadsen signed the Peterson contract of 
June 6, 1946, voluntarily as the wife of R. W. Madsen 
for the purpose of releasing her statutory dower under 
Section 101-4-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and at no 
time did R . \Y. Madsen or any other person promi1se her 
all or any portion of the purchase price (R. 73, Finding 
No. 7). There is no dispute but that R. W. Madsen was 
paid the full agreed purchase price for the property. 
Not only was his account with the corporation credited 
with the full purchase price, but by April 5, 1937, '(three 
months after the sale and credit to his account) his credits 
had been withdrawn and the account balanced (Exh. F). 
The_account had previously been balanced and reopened ~,. """'} /,..P.S"; 
JtiJht 1, 1936. The account was meticulously kept as ap-
pears in Exh. F. and as will be more fully shown in this 
brief under Point No. 6. 
No contention is made that in 1937 $10,680.00 was 
not a fair and adequate price. It further appears ''that 
during the time of their marriage R. W. Madsen trans-
ferred to LaReta C. Madsen gifts, money and property 
(in addition to all living expenses) of not less than 
$49,000.00" (R. 73, Finding No. 8). These were the 
values at the time the gifts were made, not present values. 
The court found, and there is no dispute on the mat-
ter, that LaReta C. Madsen signed the contract of J nne 6, 
1946, voluntarily as the wife of Richard W. Madsen, and 
there were no misrepresentations by R. W. :Madsen or 
any other person as an inducement to sign. She signed the 
contract for the purpose of releasing her rights to dower 
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under Section 101-4-3, Utah Code Annotated 1943 and 
there was no promise to pay her any part of the purchase 
price (R. 73, Finding No. 7). 
Another matter of inter·est and importance to this 
litigation is the fact that the original answer and counter-
claim of LaReta C. Madsen pleaded that R. W. Madsen 
and Madsonia Realty Company were one and the same, 
the corporation merely being the alter ego of R. W. Mad-
sen. The pleading with regard to this is as follows: 
''F. That the Madsonia Realty Company is 
making claim to the property described in Para-
graph 'B' hereof, as appears from their petition, 
and LaReta C. Madsen alleges the fact to be that 
Madsonia Realty Company, during the lifetime of 
R. W. Madsen, was his alter ego and had no sepa-
rate entity whatsoever and that any purported 
transfer 'Of R. W. Madsen to the Madsonia Realty 
Company i's a nullity and in truth and effect was 
an attempt to transfer the property to himself.'' 
(R. 22) 
On the morning of the trial LaReta C. Madsen filed 
an amended answer and counterclaim, dropping the 
claim of alter ego. The amended answer and counter-
claim was permitted to 'be filed 'by the court at such time 
with the understanding that all material allegations of 
the answer and counterclaim be deemed denied. The 
only objection raised by Madsonia to the amendment was 
the elimination from the pleading of the allegations hav-
ing to do with the disregard of the corporate ·entity, this 
objection being upon the ground that 'Such matter was 
necessarily a ~art of the case and the case could not be 
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decided favorably to the Madsonia Realty Company with-
out holding that such corporation was not the aher ego of 
R. W. Madsen and that it was, in fact, a separate entity. 
The record with regard to this is as follows: 
'·:MR. CANNON: If the Court please, we 
would like the record to show that we have oh-
jected to the filing of the amended answer and 
counterclaim, which withdraws the issue as to the 
corporate alter ego or the disregard of the cor-
porate entity. We think that that is necessarily 
involved in this case and consequently object to it 
being withdrawn. 
"THE COURT: But you don't ask for any 
time to meet any issues that may be framed here~ 
''~IR. CANNON: No, we do not. 
''THE COURT: All right. The objection is 
overruled.'' ( R. 97) . 
The foregoing facts, it seems to us, should be suffi-
cient to decide this case without the necessity of argu-
ment. There is no dispute that R. W. Madsen sold the 
property, received the purchas·e price, his estate was 
increased to the extent of the purchase price, his wife re-
leased her dower by signing the contract when the prop-
erty was sold to the Petersons and the parties treated the 
transaction as closed. All 'payments by the Petersons 
were turned over to 1\Iadsonia. Madsonia Realty Com-
pany had possession of the property for 11 years prior to 
the death of R. W. Madsen, collected all rents, paid all 
taxes, made all repairs and paid an income tax on capital 
gain of $9,428.49. LaReta made no claim on the proceeds 
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while her husband lived. Under these circumstances 
equity and justice require that the executor and the widow 
of the deceased do whatever is necessary to clear the 
title to the property. However, since appellants have 
presented a 60 page brief and will undoubtedly file a 
reply brief r~espondent feels it must answer their argu-
ments but will present the position of Madsonia Realty 
Company as concisely as possible. 
STA.TEMENT OF POINTS 
RELIED UPON 
POINT NO.1 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO A DEED FROM THE 
EXE,CUTOR. 
POINT NO.2 
SHOULD IT BE HELD THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO A DEED FROM THE EXECUTOR, IT IS 
CLEARLY ENTITLED TO A DECREE QUIETING TITLE 
AGAINST THE EXECUTOR. 
POINT NO.3 
THE RIGHT OF THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED BY 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
POINT NO.4 
LARETA C. MADSEN, THE WIDOW, HAS RELEASED 
HER STATUTORY DOWER. 
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POINT NO.5 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER REQUIRING 
THE WIDOW TO DEED THE PROPERTY TO MADSONIA 
REALTY COMPANY. 
POINT NO.6 
THE RELEASE OF DOWER WAS NOT SECURED BY 
FRAUD. 
POINT NO.7 
LARETA C. MADSEN IS ESTOPPED, BY CLAIMING 
THE BENEFITS OF THE WILL, FROM ASSERTING ANY 
DOWER RIGHT IN THIS PARTICULAR PIECE OF REALTY. 
POINTS numbered 2, 5 and 7 above are in effect 
points on which we cross appeal. A decree quieting title 
under Point No.2 is, however, unnepessary so long as the 
order of the trial court requiring the executor to execute ,.~~Ptl"'t:/'n r-
a deed stands. Point No. 5 is urged by ~ee in any 
event so as to preclude any possible further litigation. 
Point No. 7 is an additional reason why LaReta C. 
Madsen should not profit by her claims. 
ARGUl\1ENT 
POINT NO.1 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO A DEED FROM THE 
EXECUTOR. 
The argument hereunder includes our answer to ap-
pellants' Point No. II. Appellants claim as a defense 
that we have "proved no compliance with ·the s·tatute of 
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frauds.'' We do not claim that there is any instrument 
in writing signed by the vendor R. W. Madsen which 
sat~sfies the statute of frauds. We claim, however, that 
there is sufficient performance of the contract to circum-
vent the necessity of a signed agreement, and the title 
to the property is now held in trust for the plaintiff. Our 
statutes recognize that 'OUr courts can enforce a trust 
in a proper case without a signed written agreement and 
also that specific performance of a contract may be had ('r~ur 
even though there is no signed written agreement. See- r·
0111
i 
tion 33-5-2 U. C. A. 1943 provides: ~±~1 .: 
''Wills and Implied Trusts Excepted. 
The next preceding section shall not be con-
strued to affect the power of a testator in the dis-
position of his real estate by last will and testa-
ment; nor to prevent any trust from arising or 
being extinguished by implioation or- operation of 
law." 
Section 33-5-8 U. C. A. 1943 provides: 
"Right to Specific Performance not Affected. 
Nothing in this chapter contained · shall be 
construed to abridge the powers of courts to com-
pel the specific performance of agreements in case 
of part performance thereof.'' 
Each case having to do with specific performance of 
a contract where there has been no compliance with the 
statute of frauds is nece1ssarily different. We must ap-
ply general principles to the facts of each case as they 
arise. The general rule is set forth in the case of Besse 
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"The part performance of an oral contract 
which will avoid the statute of frauds may con-
sist of any act which puts the party performing 
in such a situation tha:t nonperformance by the 
other would be a fraud upon the person executing 
his part of the agreement according to its terms. 
Eccles v. Kendrick, 80 Mont. 120, 259 P. 609; Shaw 
v. ~fcNamara & ~iarlaw, 85 Mont. 389, 278 P. 836; 
27 C. J. pp. 343, 344.'' 
This case was expressly approved by the Supreme 
Court of Utah in the case of Utah Mercur Gold. Mining 
Company t". Herschel Gold Mining Oompa(Yby, 103 Utah 
249, 134 Pac. 2d 1094. This court stated: 
''We are therefore finally thrown back on the 
inquiry as to whether the complaint, revealing 
that the contract for an extension of the written 
lease for five years was oral, also alleged facts 
sufficient to take it out of the statute. The acts 
which are alleged to constitute part performance 
must be in pursuance of the oral contract which 
it is claimed 'said performance saves from the 
death sentence of the statute. In Besse v. 
:1\IcHenry, 89 Mont. 520, 300 P. 199 it was stated: 
'' 'Part performance which will avoid 
statue of frauds may consist of any act which 
puts party performing in such position that 
nonperformance 'by other would constitute 
fraud.''' 
The question of particular acts which constitute part 
performance so as to take the case out of the statute of 
frauds is discussed in 49 Am. Juris., at page 742. Under 
Section 459 at page 766 the question discussed i'S whether 
the payment of the consideration or a part thereof is 
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sufficient to take the case out of the statute of frauds. 
It is pointed out that there are some authorities whieh so 
hold. It appears clear, however, that the payment of the 
full purchase price, accompanied by other acts, and par-
ticularly the delivery of possession, are sufficient. See 
:Section 461 at page 770. The rule is there set forth as 
follows: 
'' * * * .Stated concisely, the performance of 
the consideration and a change of possession 
under the contract constitute a sufficient part per-
formance. In such a case it is said that the pay-
ment of the consideration strengthens the equit-
able claim ·of the plaintiff arising from delivery of 
possession, and that the vendor having accepted 
performance hy the purchaser and having placed 
the latter in possession should not be allowed to 
perpetrate a fraud by repudiating the con-
tract. * * * '' 
The question of part performance and the statute of 
frauds is thoroughly annotated in 101 A. L. R. at page 
923. At page 1053 the rule with regard to possession plus 
the payment of consideration is stated as follows: 
'' PosseS'sion of land by the vendee and the 
payment of the purchase price under and in re-
liance on a parol contract for the purchase of the 
land have been held in numerous cases to con-
stitute a sufficient part performance to warrant 
the specific enforcement of the contract.'' 
Citing cases from 29 states and territories including 
federal cases. 
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It should be borne in mind that in addition to the 
payment of consideration and delivery of possession, 
~Iadsonia Realty Company collected all of the rents, paid 
all of the taxes, made all repairs and paid an income tax 
on a profit in excess of $9,000.00. In the cases where pay-
ment of the consideration is held insufficient to grant 
specific performance it is upon the ground that the pur-
chase price may be recovered back. However, it is clear 
that Madsonia Realty Com1Jany could not now recover 
the purchase price as 11 years elapsed between the time 
of the payment and the death of R. W. Madsen and it 
would be the duty of the executor to plead the statute of 
limitations in an action for the recovery of this money. 
There are a number of other Utah cases which have 
under quite similar situations imposed a trust on the 
holder of the legal title. 
In the case of Chadwick v. Armold,, 34 Utah 48, 95 P. 
527, the defendant had promised plaintiff that he would 
bid property at sheriff's sale for the plaintiff, in reliance 
upon which the plaintiff did not attend the sale. The 
court found that the defendant held the property in trust 
for the plaintiff. The ruling of the court is stated as 
follows in paragra;ph 6 of the syllabus: 
''A trust ex maleficio arises whenever a per-
son acquires the legal title to property of another 
by means of an intentional false or fraudulent 
verbal promise to hold the same for a certain pur-
pose, and, having thus obtained the title, retains 
and claims the property as his own.'' 
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In the case of V'llln Natta v. Heywood, 57 Utah 376, 
195 P. 192, the plaintiff sued an executor upon an agree-
ment to make a will in consideration of the plaintiff liv-
ing with the deceased and performing services for him. 
The case held that the facts justified a recovery by the 
plaintiff. The rule with regard to such oral agreements is 
set forth as follows: 
"* * * As contended 1by defendants' counsel, 
this class of cases should be scrutinized with par-
ticular care ; and unlHss under the circumstances 
the proof is positive, clear, and convincing, the 
relief sought should, and will, be denied. (Citing 
cases) But, nevertheless, where the contract to 
make testamentary disposition of property is 
clear, definite, and free from doubt, such a con-
tract will he, in effect, enforced; in other words, 
equity will decree that to be done which the 
parties mutually intended to be done. (Citing 
cases). 
''Nor do we think that, under the undisputed 
facts and circumstances as shown by the record, 
this is a case coming within the statute of frauds 
(Comp. Laws Utah 1917, tit. 103, Sections 5811, 
5813, 5817), pleaded as an affirmative defense by 
the defendants. 
''The contract between the deceased and the 
plaintiff, although an oral one, was taken out of 
the statute of frauds by reason of part perform-
ance by the plaintiff. The evidence very clearly 
shows that the plaintiff remained with the de-
ceased, rendering such service'S unto him as he 
was called upon to perform under the contract 
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during said time was in possession of the prop-
erty by arrangement made by deceased. Section 
5824, tit. 103. supra, expressly provides: 
'' 'Nothing in this title contained shall 
be construed to abridge the powers of courts 
to compel the specific performance of agree-
ments in case of part performance thereof.' 
(Citing cases). 
"This ca:se, as a whole, presents, under the 
facts and circumstances, no difficulties in carry-
ing out the mutual understandings of the de-
ceased and the plaintiff.'' 
In the case of Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 Pac. 
767, the plaintiff failed to recover for the reason that 
the proof was not sufficiently clear and definite (the case 
being one of an oral gift). However, the general rule 
with regard to part performance was laid down as fol-
lows: 
'' 3. It of course is readily conceded that a 
verbal gift or parol agreement to convey land is 
within the statute of frauds, and at law a nullity. 
( Comp. Laws 1888, section 2831 and seetion 3918, 
subd. 5; Rev. St. 1898, Section 1974.) However, 
the doctrine has long been established that a 
verbal agreement, if part performed, can, not-
withstanding the requirements of the statute, be 
enforced by a court of equity. But the foundation 
of the doctrine is fraud inhering in the conse-
quence of setting up the statute. The rule is 
well stated ,by Pomeroy in his work on Specific 
Performance of Contracts (page 144) : 
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"'When a verbal contract has been 
made, and one party has knowingly aided or 
permitted the other to go on and do acts 
in part performance of the agreement, acts 
done in full reliance upon such agreement 
as a valid and binding contract, and which 
would not have been done without the agree-
ment, and which are of such a nature as to 
change the relation of the parties, and to pre-
vent a restoration to their former condition 
and an adequate compensation for the loss 
by a legal judgment for damage-s, then it 
would be a virtual fraud in the first party 
to interpose the statute of frauds as a bar to 
a completion of the contract, and thus to se-
cure for himself all the benefit of the acts 
already done in part performance, while the 
other party would not only lose ·all advantage 
from the bargain, but would be left without 
adequate remedy for his failure or compen-
sation for what he had done in pursuance of 
it. ·To prevent the success of such a palp-
able fraud, equity /1'7terpo'Ses under these 
circumstances, and compels an entire comple-
tion of the contract by decreeing its specific 
execution.' '' 
Haight v. Pearson, 11 Utah 51, 39 Pac. 479. Here 
the court held that a constructive trust arose "by opera-
tion of law" when the defendant purchased an interest 
in property belonging to an estate with the understand-
ing that it would ·be for the benefit of the plaintiff. See 
also Barrett v. Vickers, 100 Utah 534, 116 Pac. 2d 772, 
Anderson v. Cerc-one, 54 Utah 345, 180 Pac. 586, and 
Wheelright v. Roman, 50 Utah 10, 165 Pac. 513. 
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On page 13 appellants state: 
''It is impossible to know whether R. W. Mad-
sen agreed to convey only his interest or his own 
plus an inchoate dower right of Mrs. Madsen.'' 
'Ye shall point out w·herein it is clear that the sale 
in 1937 by R. ,V. :Madsen to Madsonia Realty Company 
·was of the entire fee simple title to the property. 
Exhibit U. is the federal income tax return of Mad-
sonia Realty Company for the year 1946. It is signed by 
R. ,Y. ~Iadsen as president of the company. It was stipu-
lated that the return bears his signature (R. 163). There 
is no doubt that the ·sale of the property to the Petersons 
included the inchoate dower right of Mrs. Madsen, as she 
signed the contract. Page 3 of the exhibit attached to 
Exhibit U. (the income tax return) gives the detail of 
the capital gain by ~Iadsonia on the sale to the Petersons. 
The cost of the real estate to Madsonia is listed as real 
estate-$4,120, building-$6,560, or a total of $10,680. 
The income tax return shows the purchase and sale of 
the same interest; otherwise, it would be an incorrect 
return. The same figures are in the ledger of the com-
pany. See Exhibit E. We submit that from the· facts 
shown there can be no question but that the agreement 
between R. W. ~fadsen and Madsonia Realty Company 
was to sell the entire fee simple interest in 667 East 
First South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(There may be some question in the mind of the 
court because the plaintiff alleges and the defendants 
admit that the ·sale to the Petersons was for the price of 
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$16,500 and the income tax return shows a sale for $15,-
500. The purcha;se price named in the contract, Exhibit 
A., is $16,500, but this included $1,000 of ''personal furni-
ture'' which necessarily does not appear on the income 
tax return as there was no 1profit made on that part of 
the transaction. The $1,000 item of furniture appears on 
Exhibit E). 
POINT NO.2 
SHOULD IT BE HELD THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO A DEED FROM THE EXECUTOR, IT IS 
CLEARLY ENTITLED TO A DECREE QUIETING TITLE 
AGAINST THE EXECUTOR. 
The court found and it is undisputed that from J anu-
ary 1, 1937 to June, 1946, when the property was sold 
to the Petersons, that Madsonia Realty Company, 
through its tenan·ts, had possession of the property, col-




the c~ost of rep·airs .. The p·roperty was iinp·rove·d and ·en- l!.:~ 
closed (R. 175-176). This in and of itself is sufficient to ;itJ, 
acquire title by adverse possession as against R. W. 
l\fadsen and his estate. There is no reason why Mad-
sonia Realty Company should not have a decree quieting 
title as against the executor and estate except that, hav-
ing found under Point No. 1 above that the executor 
should execute and deliver a deed to the Madsonia Realty 
Company, there was nn purpose or reason for quieting 
title against the executor. Should, however, this court 
for any reason reverse the trial court on its order requir-
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ing the executor to execute a deed there is no reason why 
it should not then order the district court to. enter a 
decree quieting title against the exe:cutor and the estate. 
POINT NO.3 
THE RIGHT OF THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED BY 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The right of ~ladsonia Realty Company as set forth 
under our Point No. 1 is an equitable right. The court in 
permitting the plaintiff to recover the legal title from the 
executor is, in effect, holding that R. W. Madsen and his 
estate are trustees of the legal title for the benefit of 
~Iadsonia Realty Company. The statute of limitations 
does not begin to run on such a right until there has been 
a demand and refusal to make the conveyance. In other 
words there is no breach of the trust until the rights of 
the beneficiary have been repudiated by the trustee. 
This is recognized in the case of Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 
116, 148 Pac. 1096 in syllabus 3 as follows: 
''Where an administrator of a wife sued the 
executors of her husband to recover property 
alleged to be her separate estate, and the allega-
tions of the complaint, while showing lapse of 
ti1ne in excess of the statute of limitations, set up 
no demand and refusal, ouster, hostile assertion, 
or holding on the part of the husband against the 
wife, while asserting cotenancy, the married rela-
tion, and other trust or fiduciary relations against 
which the limitations do not run until demand and 
refusal, ouster, or open repudiation, the complaint 
was not demurrable." (page 129). 
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The statute of limitations can never run against a 
person who is in possession of the land. This is for the 
reason that the 'Person in possession has no reason to 
presume that the trustee will not fulfill his obligation. 
In 34 Am. Jur., page 296, Section 381, the rule is stated 
as follows: 
"§ 381. Persons in Possession of Land.-
As noted above, a statute cannot be sustained as 
one of limitation where it requires one in posses-
sion ·of property to bring an action within a given 
time or forfeit it, and it is laid down in a number 
of cases that as a general rule, the statute of limit-
ations does not run against one in possession of 
land. Thus, the statute does not run against a 
mortgagee in possession, because he is in the 
actual possession of all the law gives him and the 
possession itself is prima facie evidence that the 
money is not paid. For a similar reason, it has 
been asserted that the statute does not begin to 
run against a cestui que trust in possession until 
the date of his ·ousteT, no matter what the nature 
of the trust may be,** * * '' 
It is further stated in 55 Am. Jur., pages 784-785, Sec-
tion 357, as follows : 
"§ 357. Effect of Performance by Pur-
chaser.-According to the rule that a deed is ordi-
narily necessary to pass strict legal title, the pay-
Inent of the entire purchase m·oney does not it-
self vest the legal title in the purchaser, and his 
remedy where the vendor refuses to convey is in . 
equity to compel specific performance.* * *After 
the purchaser has fully performed, he is, in 
equity, regarded as the absolute owner of an in-
defeasible estate, and the vendor is a naked trus-
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tee having no interest •but charged with the simple 
duty to convey to the purchaser upon demand. 
'Vhen the payments are fully made, the entire 
equitable title is in the vendee and the vendor 
retains the naked legal title in trust for him. When 
the contract price is fully paid, the entire title is 
equitably vested in the vendee, and he may compel 
a conveyance of the legal title by the vendor, his 
heirs or his assigns. His equitable est~ate cannot 
be lost by laches or the st·at·ute of limitations so 
long as he is in the possession and enjoyment of 
his estate according to his rights." 
The foregoing authorities dispose of any doubt of 
the plaintiff's right to a deed by reason of the bar of 
the statute of limitations. However, we again point out 
that if the plaintiff is not entitled to a deed from the 
executor the plaintiff nevertheless is entitled to a decree 
quieting title based upon adverse possession and it is 
the statute of limitations itself which gives the plaintiff 
such right and therefore, any benefit of limitations is 
entirely in favor of the plaintiff and does not benefit the 
defendants. 
POINT NO.4 
LARETA C. MADSEN, THE WIDOW, HAS RELEASED 
HER STATUTORY DOWER. 
Respondent's argument under this heading is in 
support of the court's finding: 
''That LaReta C. Madsen signed said con-
tract for the purpose of and did release her statu-
tory dower right in said property pursuant to 
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Section 101-4-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.'' 
'( R. 73, Finding No. 7) 
It is also in answer to appellants' Point No. m and 
argument in support thereof found on pages 18 to 46 of 
their brief. 
Appellants' argument is ·divided into four headings 
designated (a), (b), (c), and (d). We will consider each 
of these arguments separately, but first point out that 
appellants seem to rely upon a fifth point not related 
the the points specifically mentioned. This is found on 
page 20 where appellants state: 
''The law is settled that unless a woman re-
ceives consideration she cannot release or convey 
her inchoate dower interest in land.'' 
Appellants cite no authority, and their statement is 
contrary to the authorities on the subject. The following 
statement is taken from 28 C. J. S. 138-139: 
"The wife's release of dower is valid and ef-
fectual without consideration inuring to herself, 
if supported by an adequate consideration moving 
t'O her husband, althought she may take a con-
sideration inuring to herself as a condition of re-
leasing dower.'' 
In view of the complete misstatement of the law and 
a;bsence of any authority cited by appellants, we do not 
deem it necessary to argue this point at length. How-
ever, we cite the following cases which hold that by 
joining in a contract with her husband the wife releases 
her dower rights and is ·entitled to no portion of the pro-
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JlcBride's Estate, 235 N.W. 166; Marshall v. Reed, 211 
N. \V. 637; and In Re B.rown's Estate, 14 Pacific 2nd 
1107. 
\Y e proceed now to discuss the arguments of appel-
lants under the four separate headings. 
On page 19 appellants state: 
"'(a) Since under the theory of plaintiff 
and the trial court R. W. Madsen executed the 
Peterson contract as trustee of plaintiff, the sig-
nature of :Mrs. ~Iadsen was ineffectual as a re-
lease of her dower as to any one, including the 
Petersons, since a wife cannot release inchoate 
dower unless joined by her huband. '' 
It seems that appellants are attempting to make the 
fine distinction that because LeReta C. Madsen signed a 
contract in which her husband was in fact acting as a 
trustee, her signature to the contract is ineffectual for 
the purpose of releasing her dower. If this court should 
so hold then she could use the same argument against 
the Petersons, the purchasers under the contract, as well 
as in this action. Actually, the trial court has gone no 
farther than to hold that as the situation now stands 
LaReta C. Madsen has released her dower in the prop-
erty in question. The court refused to order her to exe-
cute a deed to :Jfadsonia Realty Company, because, as it 
reasoned, she had not contracted to do so. We will dis-
cuss this phase of the case under our Point No. 5. How-
ever, coming back to appellants' argument, they cite no 
case which holds that the release of dower is ineffectual 
simply because the husband was acting as trustee or was 
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performing his duty to a third person who had paid him ru 
in full for the property. All of appellants' authorities 
may be distinguished by the f¥t that she did actually roo 
join with her husband in the same instrument. ~~t 
In the quotation from .Scribn~ on Dower, 2nd Edi-
tion, Volume 2, page 313, found on page 21 of their brief, 
it is stated: 
''Hence if the -conveyance of the husband be 
inoperative, or if it be set aside, or avoided, the 
right of dower remains unimpaired.'' 
We have no such situation here and will admit that if ,ij[ 
Mr. Madsen had lived and the Peterson contract had been :ult 
rescinded for any reason or forfeited, LaReta C. Madsen mer 
would then have been restored to her dower rights the ~nr 
same as if he had taken title to real estate in the first i:ai 
instanee. 
In the case of Robinson v. Bates, 3 Met. (Mass. 1841) 
cited by appellants at page 22, it was simply held that 
where a creditor had set aside a deed which had been 
given by a husband and wife such deed could no longer 
be used as a release of dower. The quotation from Tif-
famy on Real Property, 3rd Edition, Volume 2, at pages 
22 and 23 of aprpellants' brief, indicates that in S'Ome 
states the wife's dower may be released only in the same 
instrument as is signed by the husband. In addition to 
the fact that the husband did sign this instrument, we 
believe that the rule as pointed out ,by Tiffany as the 
law of some states is not now the law in Utah. Utah does 
not have common law dower. Common law dower and 
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curtesy were abolished as provided in Section 101-4-
9, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. The substitute for com-
mon law dower is provided for in Section 101-4-3. The 
section provides : 
"One-third in value of all the legal or equit-
able estates in real property possessed by the 
husband at any time during the marriage to which 
the wife has made no relinquishment of her right 
shall he set apart as her property in fee simple if 
she survives him * * * * '' 
This statute was copied from the Iowa Code. The 
Supreme Court of Iowa has held that the common law 
rule that the wife is required to join in the same instru-
ment with her husband is not the law under the sub-
stituted statutory dower and under the emancipation 
statutes now existing. 
In the case of Fowler v. Chadima, 111 N.vV. 808 
(I·owa 1907), the plaintiff was the widow of David H. 
Fowler who in his lifetime had given a deed without his 
wife's signature but the plaintiff as his wife had subse-
quently deeded the property to his grantee in a serparate 
instrument for the purpose of releasing her dower. 'The 
court held the separate deed effective to release the 
dower under the modern statutes. The court said: 
''The ·one question thus presented is whether 
husband and wife must unite in the same deed in 
order to effect a release of the latter's contingent 
right of dower. In a brief showing much industry 
and research, counsel for appellant has arrayed a 
large number of authorities for our consideration, 
many ·of which may fairly be cited in support of 
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his proposition that at common law a joinder of 
husband and wife in the 'same deed was necessary 
to an effectual release of the wife's right of 
dower; but modern innovations by statute and 
otherwise, upon common-law rules affecting the 
property rights of married women, have been 
so great and are of such radical character that 
the earlier precedents upon the subject are of but 
little value, save as matters of history. According 
to the ancient theory, the individuality and inde-
pendence of the wife were so merged (or sub-
merged, rather) in the person and authority of 
her husband that, generally speaking, she was 
held incompetent to transact any business, great 
or small, with reference to her own estate, or 
with reference to her interest in the estate of her 
husband, unless he united with her; and, while 
the hus•band could not by the conveyance of his 
real estate defeat the wife's contingent interest 
therein, yet, even after an absolute conveyance by 
him of his own estate or interest in each property, 
his wife was disqualified to release the possibility 
of a right in her part, which could not ripen into 
enjoyment except by his death, until he was will-
ing to unite with her in executing the necessary 
writing for that purpose. If there was ever any 
good reason for this rule, it has ceased to exist. 
In many, if not all, of all the later cases cited by 
the counsel for appellant, the decision has been 
reached, not S'O much because of reliance upon the 
common law rule, as because the terms of the stat-
ute of the particular state seem to require the 
deed or release to he executed by both husband 
and wife. Our own statute does not attempt to 
prescribe the manner or form in which dower 
may 'be released. It does provide (Code, Sec. 
2919) that a married woman may convey or in-
cumber real estate or any interest therein belong-
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ing to her, and may control the s·ame, or contract 
with reference thereto, to the same extent and in 
the same manner as other persons. Technically 
speaking, dower, in the common-law sense of the 
term, has long been abolished in this state, and the 
wife's interest in her deceased husband's lands is 
a distributive share of one-third in fee of all the 
real property possessed by him during his mar-
riage, ·which has not heen sold on judicial sale, 
'and to which the wife has made no relinquish-
ment of her right.' Now, although a contingent 
dower right may not be an estate, it certainly 
does constitute an interest in land which is recog-
nized by the statute as being the subject of re-
linquishment by her in the life of her husband. 
Such being the case, it would seem that, under the 
general terms of Code, Sec. 2919, cited, its re-
linquishment may be accomplished by her 'in the 
same manner' as other persons not laboring under 
the disabilities of coverture would relinquish a 
contingent or remote inter·est in like property. 
So long as the husband retains his title to the 
land, there is good reason for saying the wife 
should not be empowered to convey or transfer 
her dower right to a stranger. There is also 
obviously good reason for saying that, when a 
husband has by his 'separate deed conveyed the 
fee to a third person, it should not be competent 
for his wife to convey or transfer her contingent 
interest to a stranger to the title, and the statute 
has wisely provided that a wife's contingent in-
terest in her husband's property shall not be sub-
ject of contract or traffic between them; hut, 
when the husband has once conveyed the fee, why 
should the wife not be at liberty to relinquish her 
dower interest to the purchaser with or without 
her husband's consent~ 
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''The wife's deed, under such circumstances 
is not a grant or conveyance, in the legal sense of 
the term, though we frequently use those tenns 
as applicable to her act. She has no estate in the 
land which she can grant or eonvey to another. 
She has at most a contingent interest, a !possi-
bility of an estate which may accrue to her in 
the event that she outlives her husband, and, 
while 'she cannot sell or convey it to another, she 
can release or relinquish it in favor of the owner 
of the fee, save only where the owner of the fee 
is her husband. Her relinquishment adds nothing 
to the quality of the estate of the fee owner, but 
it removes a burden or incumbrance therefrom. 
By enabling a married woman to engage in busi-
ness in her own name, and to buy, s·ell, own, and 
control property as freely and effectively as her 
husband can do, our statute necessarily subjects 
her· to the ordinary rules of the law of estop-
pel, and when upon a sufficient consideration 
moving dire'ctly to her, or upon a consider-
ation moving to her husband in the sale of the fee 
of his land, she by deed or by formal release, re-
linquishes her dower right, she should be held 
estopped to say that, notwithstanding such con-
veyance or relinquishment, she still demands 
an admeasurement of dower upon the husband's 
death. Indeed, it was the general rule, even at 
common law, that the wife's release of dower was 
held operative as an estoppel, rather than as a 
contract. Gillilan v. Swift, 14 Hun. (N.Y.) 574; 
Reiff v. Horst, 55 Md. 42. And deeisions holding 
her estopped by her separate deed were not un-
known before the modern statutes emancipating 
women from most of the disabilities of coverture. 
Shepherd v. Howard, 2 N.H. 507; Fowler v. 
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Shearer, 7 Mass. 14; Irving v. Campbell, (Super. 
Ct.) ± N. Y. Supp. 103; N el~son v. Holly, 50 Ala. 
3." 
The cases cited by appellants which require the re-
lease of dower to be by instrument joined in by the hus-
band are not the law in Iowa, from which state we 
adopted our statute. However, were these cases the law 
of Utah, we again point out that LaReta C. Madsen did 
sign "\Yith her husband to release her dower. 
At page 26 appellants state: 
"(b) Even if LaReta C. Madsen agreed to 
conYey her dower rights to the Petersons, that 
fact does not enlarge the rights of plaintiff.'' 
The burden of appellants' argument under this point 
seems to be that there is no privity between the Madsoni:a 
Realty Company and the Petersons with whom the con-
tract signed by LaReta G. Madsen was made. Certainly if 
the argument under (a) of appellants' P<lint No. III is 
based upon the fact that R. W. Madsen was acting ~s 
trustee for Madsonia Realty Company, then Madsonia 
Realty Company is in equity and is actually the seller of 
the property, and there is privity of contract between 
~Iadsonia and the Petersons. We not only do not admit 
that there is no privity between Madsonia Realty Com-
pany and the Petersons, but our very claim is that Mad-
sonia Realty Company sold the property to the Peter-
sons, collected all of the money so far paid and Madsonia 
is obligated to deliver title. So far as we are concerned, 
we are willing to consider that the contract is the same as 
if it had been signed by Madsonia Realty Company and 
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LaReta C. Madsen as the sellers. We claim, therefore, 
the same relationship between Madsonia Realty Com-
pany and the Petersons as if Madsonia Realty Company 
were actually named as the vendor. Cases wherein 
the dower right has been released to a third person 
whose title never materializes are not in point. It is 
such situations that are discussed in Scribne.r on Dower, 
Volume 2, page 307, quoted at page 27 of appellants' 
brief and in the case of Pixley v. Bennett, 11 Mass. 298, 
and Kitzmiller v. ~arv Rensselaer, 10 Ohio State 63, 
cited at page 30 of their brief. 
Appellants cite the case of Gee, et al. v. Baum, et al., 
58 Utah 445, 199 Pacific 680 (see page 31). The ques-
tion in this case was whether or not a deed which had 
been signed by a husband and wife but which had never 
been delivered could constitute a release of the widow's 
dower. Of course, it was held that it did not, and we 
admit that any instrument signed by a wife which never 
becomes effective because of non-delivery cannot operate 
as a release of dower. 
In the case of In Re Reynolds' Estate, 62 Pacific 
(2d) 270, 90 Utah 415 (cited by appellants at page 32), 
it was held that the giving of a mortgage by a husband 
and wife in the lifetime of the husband did not consti-
tute a release of dower by the widow so far as it affected 
the mnount of property which she could claim after the 
death of her husband as against other heirs, creditors 
of the deceased, or amount owing for inheritance taxes. 
The 1nortgage had not been foreclosed. The court points 
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out that a mortgagee receives no equitable or legal title, 
nothing is transferred to the mortgagee and the only 
effect of signing by the wife is to release her dower in 
the event the mortgage is foreclosed. 
In the case of Free v. Little, 31 Utah 449, 88 Pacific 
407 (cited at page 33 of appellants' brief), there was 
an attempt to specifically enforce a c'Ontract of sale, 
purely executory except as to the payment of $60 (the 
contract being for $12,000). The wife had never signed 
the contract and it was necessarily held that specific 
performance would not be granted. frhere is no analogy 
to the present situati'On. 
Appellants' third argument under Point No. III 
is as follows: 
'' (c) The seller under an executory con tract 
of sale of real property retains a 'legal or equit-
able estate in real property.' Under our statute 
the widow shares in this interest.'' 
Here the burden 'Of appellants' argument seems to he 
that because after signing a contract a husband has some 
interest until he is paid, the wife's dower attaches to 
such interest. The argument is even made that because 
a wife's dower does not attach to the buyer's interest, 
it must attach to the seller's interest. The wife has only 
one dower right in one piece of property. If she signs 
away that right or releases that right, certainly she does 
not have another dower interest, whatever rights the 
vendor still may have. A1prpellants are trying to- give her 
a second dower interest. We submit that if she has re-
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leased her dower in a spe-cific piece of property by the 
signing of a contract, that ends the matter, and there 
is no use of further discussion as to what interest the 
vendor still may have. We have already pointed out 
that the signing of the contract by a wife gives her no 
interest in the proceeds. We have hesitated to conclude 
that appellants' argument under this portion of the brief 
is simply that the widow has a dower interest in what is 
left in her husband after she has released her dower hy 
signing the contract, but we can make nothing else of the 
argument. On page 44 appellants conclude this phase 
of the argument by the statement: 
''However, even if the Court finds that the 
Peterson contract was joined by her as the wife 
of Mr. Madsen, it is nevertheless clear upon 
principle and authority that she retains a dis-
tributive share interest in the land which the 
:plaintiff in this case has no right to acquire.'' 
The same statement is in substance found on page 41 as 
follows: 
"In Utah, therefore, under our statute, when 
a husband and wife join in an executory sales con-
tract, the wife has a distributive share interest 
in the equity retained by the sellers, which she 
may assert against all the world, subject only 
to the right of the buyer upon his full perform-
ance.'' 
We have set forth the two foregoing quotations 
from appellants' brief as showing that their position is 
simply an attempt to claim dower in what is left in the 
real estate contract after the wife has signed the contract 
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for the express purpose of releasing her dower. To so 
hold would mean that a complete release could never 
be secured as the husband as vendor has some interest 
until the contract is paid and a conveyance made. But 
this interest is not subject to dower when the wife has 
signed the contract to sell. 
Appellants cite the case of Tyler v. Tyler, 50 Mont. 
65, 1-!-! Pacific 1090 (page 42 of their brief) for the 
proposition that "it has been held that it is contrary 
to the policy of the law to apply a technical doctrine 
to defeat a wife's dower." The case simply holds that 
where a wife has signed an option to sell, which option 
has not been exercised at the date of death of her hus-
band, the property is not then ''converted'' to person-
alty and the widow still has a dower interest in the land. 
This is for the reason that there is, at the time of death, 
no contract of sale. The court recognized that if there 
were a contract to sell the opposite result must neces-
sarily follow. The court said (page 1091 of 144 Pacific): 
''The distinction between such a transaction 
(an option) and an agreement to sell was clearly 
pointed out in Ide v. Leiser, 10 Montana 5, 24 
Pacific 695, 24 Am . .St. Rep. 17. The one is the 
sale of an option-an executed contract-which 
has not become an agreement to 'sell until the 
election has been exercised. The other is an ex-
ecutory agreement which either party may re-
quire the other to perform according to its 
terms.'' 
In this case it is the a'Ppellant, LaReta C. Madsen, 
who is trying to seize upon a technicality to secure her 
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dower. This will be pointed out hereafter under Point 
No. 7. It is clear that R. W. Madsen intended that his 
two sons should receive the stock in Madsonia Realty 
Company which necessarily includes all of its assets. 
LaReta C. Madsen is trying to secure for herself more 
than was intended by the will even though it has given 
her more than one-third of all of her husband's estate. 
Under (d) appellants state: 
"'The execution of a contract to sell land does 
not extinguish the sellers' interest in the land." 
This argument is nothing more than a repetition of 
(c). The argument which follows, for what purpose we 
do not know, tries to draw an analogy between the 
wife's dower interest and tenants in common. It is 
argued that because a purchaser from tenants in com-
mon would have to pay both of the tenants, the Petersons 
as purchasers from R. W. Madsen must also pay part of 
the purchase price to LaReta C. Madsen. We have an-
swered this argument under Point No. 4, page 21, supra. 
While we feel that there is nothing further to be said on 
this subject, we point out that the tenancy in common 
argument is contrary to all of the appellants' state-
ments that the wife's interest is merely a contingent 
expectancy. There are no rules which can be followed 
. to determine the amount which should be paid to a wife 
under these circumstances even if it were held that she 
is entitled to any of the proceeds of the sale. 
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POINT NO.5 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER REQUIRING 
THE WIDOW TO DEED THE PROPERTY TO MADSONIA 
REALTY COMPANY. 
The trial court denied plaintiff's right to a deed 
from LaReta C. Madsen. On this point we cross-appeal. 
Madsonia Realty Company in its original petition in 
probate had asked nothing from LaReta C. Madsen. 
When she intervened and asked for an adjudication of 
her rights Madsonia then asked affirmative relief against 
her by reply. While the ultimate result may he the :same 
whether she is compelled to give a deed to Madsonia 
now or to give a deed to the Petersons or their successors 
in interest when the contract is fully paid, Madsonia 
Realty ·Company is nevertheless entitled at this time to 
a deed from her for the following rerusons: 
The trial court in refusing to order her to give a deed 
reasoned that her agreement under the contract was 
only to give a deed to the vendees when ~ayment was 
completed, and an order now would be premature. If the 
contract should be forfeited she would never be called 
upon to deed the property to the Petersons. We may 
concede that this would be true if R. W. Madsen were now 
living. But the rule is not the same if the forfeiture 
occurs after the death of the vendor. 
Whether property is realty or personalty for the 
purpose of dower and distr~bution to heirs must be de-
cided once and for all as of the date of death of the 
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owner. 'The law of inheritance or right to statutory 
dower cannot be altered by an event occurring subse-
quent to death. 
Suppose this were a case where only the widow and 
heirs were now involved and it becomes time for distribu-
tion. Without question the proceeds from the sale re-
ceived subsequent to the death of R. W. Madsen would 
be distributed as personalty and LaReta C. Madsen 
would be given no one-third dower interest in what has 
been paid pending probate. The unpaid portion of the 
purchase price would also be distributed as personalty. 
Could the Decree of Distribution be changed by a forfeit-
ure of the contract after distribution~ If it could, the 
result would be hopeless confusion and uncertainty. For 
the same reason and upon the same legal theory, the 
change from personalty to realty cannot be made by 
forfeiture after death. The decedent is not seized of the 
realty at the time of death under a contract of sale. The 
forf·eiture after death does not vest a deceased with 
the title to real estate in his lifetime. The statute gives 
dower only to property owned during marriage, and this 
does not mean property coming back by forfeiture after 
death. This is supported by authorities. 
The following statement is taken from 55 Am. Jur., 
pages 785 and 786, Section 359 : 
"The equitable principle that the interest of 
the vendor under an executory land contract is to 
be regarded as personalty has been frequently ap-
plied in the distribution of a deceased vendor's 
estate; accordingly, it is held that the vendor's 
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interest in the land which he has contracted to 
sell~ passes to his personal representative as 
pe)onalty, together with the right to the unpaid 
purchase money and securities therefore." 
The same rule is laid down in the case of Bowne v. 
Ide, 109 Conn. 307, 147 Atlantic 4, 66 A.L.R. 1036 at page 
1041 as follows: 
''The estate of an owner of real estate under 
contract of sale, under the doctrine of equitable 
conversion, becomes in equity an estate in person-
alty, and in case of his death before his contract 
is performed, or fully performed, the contraet and 
the proceeds thereof are personal property or 
assets in the hands of his administrator or per-
sonal representative, to be administered as the 
rest of his personal assets are administered. 
Emery v. Cooley, 83 Conn. 235, 76 Atl. 529; note 
in Ann. Cas. 1914D, page 419." 
The following statement is taken from 19 Am. Jur., 
pages 15 and 16: 
"On the other hand, the vendor's interest 
under a contract for the sale of land constitutes 
personalty and on his death is distributable as 
such, together with the unpaid purchase money 
and ·securities therefore. Even whe.re the land is 
recovered back by the widow and heirs of the 
ow"ner .after his death, urvd,er a clause of forfeiture 
in the cont11act of sale, its status is not changed 
and it is distributed to the heirs of the deceased 
owner ·as pe.rsonal property.'' 
LaReta G. Madsen should he required to deed the 
property to Madsonia subject to the Peterson contract 
to avoid future litigation. It is the general rule that a 
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court of equity will make final disposition of litigation. 
While it will be clear that upon the payment of the pur-
chase price by the Petersons, or their successors in in-
terest, that they can compel L.aReta C. Madsen, by 
reason 'Of having signed the contract, to convey the prop~ 
erty: she may refuse to do so, which will require another ) 
law suit. :She has chosen to litigate her rights to the real 
estate and the proceeds thereof in this action. She should, 
therefore, be precluded from further raising the ques-
tion. A forfeiture now will not restore her dower. A 
deed from her to :Madsonia Realty Company will finally 
dispose of the matter. The equity rule referred to is 
clearly set forth in 19 Am. Jur., 281 (Equity 409) as fol-
lows: 
"§ 409. Disposal of Litigation.-It is a 
fundamental principle of chancery courts finally 
to dispose of litigation, making as complete a deci-
sion on all the points embraced in a cause as the 
nature of the case will admit, so as to preclude 
not only all further litigation between the same 
parties, but also the possibility that the parties 
may at any future period be disturbed or harras-
sed by the claim of any other person, as well as 
the possibility of any danger or injustice being 
done to other persons who are not ,before the 
court in the present proceedings. Acting pursuant 
to this principle, courts of equity require not only 
that the pleadings shall so present all the matters 
in controversy that they may be properly adjudi-
cated, but also that, so far as practicable, all 
persons having any interest in the subject matter 
of the controversy be made parties, to the end that 
their rights ma~T be ascertained, their claims 
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adjudged, or their titles bound. The extent of 
the relief that the court will grant is therefore 
commensurate with the rights, duties, claims, 
and titles of all the parties to the suit, so far as 
those rights, duties, claims, and titles appear in 
the pleadings and are established by the prouf. 
·'The decree should be adapted to the· cir-
cumstances and necessities of each case and 
should be so designed as to put an end to the 
litigation, and not to foster it. A final decree 
which undertakes to dispose of the whole cause 
should include a disposition of i'Ssues which are 
raised by a cross bill and answer as well as those 
which are presented by the pleadings in chief. 
''Where several parties, being all those in-
terested in a legal controversy, are before the-
court asking that their respective rights be deter-
mined, and such rights are capable of ascertain-
ment, a decree, based upon indefinite findings, 
which does not determine the essential rights of 
all the parties and leaves a material part of the 
controversy undetermined, is insufficient and 
will not be upheld on appeal.'' 
POINT NO.6 
THE RELEASE OF DOWER WAS NOT SECURED BY 
FRAUD. 
This subdivision of uur brief is in direct answer to 
Point No. IV of appellants' brief which is argued at 
pages 46 to 59. Nowhere is it claimed by LaReta C. 
Madsen that any affirmative misrepresentations were 
made as an inducement to sign the contract. This is. 
particularly interesting in view of the allegations in her 
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pleading. The following is her claim as set forth in 
paragraph 4 of her amended counterclaim (R. 55, 56): 
'' * * * That at the time of entering into the 
said contract said R. W. Madsen and Madsonia 
Realty Company through its agents and servants 
advised LaReta C. Madsen that said Mr. and Mrs. 
Madsen would have no further use for the said 
property inasmuch as R. W. Madsen and LaReta 
C. Madsen had their homes at the Hotel Utah and 
in Cottonwood; that s~aid property was that of 
said R. W. Mads en, arnd that it would be to their 
best interest to sell the s~ame to said Petersons 
amd to re,alize the value thereof; * * * that at the 
time of the execution of the said contract to James 
0. Peterson and C. Amelia Peterson, LaReta C. 
M~ad,sen believed and was led to believe by the 
words ~and ,acts of the Staid Richard W. Mads en 
for himself or on behalf of Madsonia Realty 
Company that said property was the property of 
R. W. Madsen only." 
She completely failed to support the allegation of 
misrepresentation. In fact, she made no attempt to 
do so. The only testimony in regard to the matter was 
given by Mrs. Madsen on direct examinations as follows: 
'' Q. Mrs. Madsen, did you at any time prior to 
the death of R. W. Madsen know that anyone 
had any interest in 667 East First South 
other than R. W. Madsen and the Petersons 1 
A. No. 
Q. I will show you now what has been marked 
Exhibit A, a uniform real estate contract, 
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and call your attention to a signature on the 
back, LaReta C. Madsen. Is that your sig-
nature? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you ever discussed this contract with 
anyone other than R. W. Madsen 1 
A. No. 
Q. Where was the contract signed 1 
~\. As I recollect, it was- Thfr. Madsen brought 
it to our home, and I signed it." (R. 191-192') 
The strength of Mrs. Madsen's position can, we 
believe, be well estimated by the difference in her plead-
ing and proof. She did not hesitate to plead fraudulent 
misrepresentations by her deceased husband, but did not 
have the courage to go through with the accusation. 
There were no affirmative misrepresentations and 
she relies solely upon failure to dis3lose. No authority 
is cited which requires as a condition to the validity of 
a transaction that all pos-sible matters motivating the 
transaction or things which can be considered as back-
ground be affirmatively stated. She did not testify that 
she would not have. signed the contract if she knew that 
her husband had already sold the property to Madsonia 
Realty Company. She personally was promised nothing 
in any event and it made no difference to her personally 
whether the property had already 'been sold or not. 
Undoubtedly if she had had the temerity to ask her hus-
band that she be paid a part of the purchase pri,ce or 
be paid for the release of her dower, he would have paid 
her. We assert, however, that it made no difference to 
LaReta C. Madsen personally whether the property had 
already been sold or not, but if it was a material matter 
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to her 'She could very well have asked with regard to the 
disposition of the purchase price. Her hus·band was 
under the legal duty of doing whatever was necessary 
to consummate the sale which he had made on behalf 
of Madsonia Realty Company, and she should have asked 
her price at the time she signed the contract or been 
satisfied with the legal effect thereof. 
We wish here to point out that it is not disputed 
that R. W. Madsen received cash for the property in 
1937 and that a part o.f the pur.chase price actually was 
turned over to his wife, LaReta C. Madsen. We have 
heretofore mentioned the account which R. W. Madsen 
carried with the Madsonia Realty Company in which 
he was given credit for the purchase price of $10,680 
on January 1, 1937. This account is shown in the ledger 
and was introduced in evidence as Exhibit F. The fol-
lowing are the complete debit and credit entries from 
Oct. 10, 1935 to April 5, 1937, the account having been 







































ToTAL CREDITS $14,233.7 4 
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DEBITS 
Date Items Fol. Debits 
Oct. 10, 1935 To Bank Loan 250 1,000.00 
Oct. 1S, 1935 To Bank Loan 251 42.00 
Oct. 1S, 1935 To Bank Z.C.M.I. 251 395.68 
Dec. 4,1935 To Bank 258 456.00 
Dec. 21, 1935 To Bank 259 1,250.00 
Dec. 30, 1935 To Bank 259 201.28 
Dec. 31, 1935 To Bank 259' 155.04 
AprilS, 1936 LaReta C. Madsen 271 205.00 
April20, 1936 LaReta C. Mads en 272 175.00 
JuneS, 1936 LaReta C. llf ads en 280 1,220.00 
June 22, 1936 LaReta C. Madsen 280 7SO.OO 
July 15, 1936 Int. Silver Co. 2S1 S67.90 
July 29, 1936 Cash 2S3 300.00 
Jan. 5,1937 1'Share Hotel Utah 305 57.50 
Jan.S,1937 ~Ioney going East 305 300.00 
Jan.S,1937 Rwy. Ticket 305 25S.95 
Jan.30,1937 Z.C.M.I. 307 706.02 
Feb.13,1937 Loan 310 100.00 
Feb.17,1937 R. W. Madsen Jr. 310 140.00 
Feb.17,1937 Adams L.D.S. Chur'ch 310 300.00 
Mar.S,1937 Loan 313 56S.55 
Mar.29,1937 Mrs. L. C. Madsen 1,1S7.50 
Mar.29,1937 Utah State Nat'l Bank 315 2,500.00 
Mar.29,1937 Utah State Nat'l Bank 315 10.42 
Mar.31,1937 Standard Furn. Co. 
Wife 315 196.90 
Apr. 5,1937 4 Shares Utah S. Nat'l 316 860.00 
ToTAL DEBITS $14,233.74 
It will be noticed that during this period LaReta 
received credits totalling $3,567.50 (R. 73, Finding No. 
S), $1,187.50 of which was after the sale of the home. 
(Ex. F., R. 190.) 
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In regard to the credit to the account of LeReta 
C. Madsen which showed that she received a total of 
$3,567.50 from the ~ount of R. W. Madsen, it is inter-
esting to note that during the trial when all parties had 
rested the trial court pointed out the facts with regard 
to such credits to LaReta C. Madsen (R. 193-195) and 
stated its intention to rule against her on this ground 
(R. 190). Thereupon her attorney asked leave to re-
open (R. 190). :She, in the face of the book entries, 
denied receipt of any money from Madsonia. The fol-
lowing is he-r testimony which is anything but convincing. 
Note that she denies receipt of any money from Mad-
sonia, except money which she borrowed, when the books 
positively show that she received money through Mad-
sonia, not as a loan, but which had been credited to her 
account from the account of R. W. Madsen. 
'' Q. Mrs. Madsen, did you ever have an account 
with the Madsonia· Realty Company~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know how long you had an account 
with that company~ 
A. I ,can't recollect. 
Q. Do you have a recollection within any par-
ticular period at all whether or rrot you had 
an account with that company~ 
A. I used to borrow money and pay it hack to 
the company. Mr. Madsen let me do that. 
Q. Was that the only transa.ction you had with 
Madsonia, was as to money which you bor-
rowed from that company~ 
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A. As far as I remember, it is the only-
THE COUR-T: I didn't hear you. 
A. As far as I remember, it is the only ones. 
Q. Did ~Ir. Madsen ever put any money in that 
account for you Y 
A. I don't understand your question. 
Q. Well, I think it is plain.· Would you read it, 
please, Reporter, and see if you can't under-
stand it. 
A. What account' 
Q. vV ell, the account that we have been speaking 
of here between you and the Madsonia, your 
account and the Madsonia Realty Company. 
A. I borrowed m"Oney from the Madsonia Realty 
Company and paid it back. Mr. Madsen 
never paid any of the account hack. 
Q. You don't know of any time when Mr. Madsen 
put any money in that account for you' 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. And the only transactions that you re~all 
are transactions wherein you borrowed mon-
ey and paid it back,. 
A. That's all I can recollect. 
Q. Mrs. Madsen, I show you a sheet from the 
ledger of what has been testified as the Mad-
sonia Realty Company and a:sk you to look 
at the third ite1n on the right-hand side of 
that sheet, this i tern here (indicating). First, 
I will ask you, Mrs. Madsen, this sheet has 
your name, LaReta C. Madsen, at the top, 
does it not' 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Would you look at the third item on the 
right-hand side and see if that refreshes your 
recollection with regard to the matters that 
I have been asking you about¥ 
.A. No, this does not. I do not know about this, 
as far as I can recollect. 
Q. Do you know what that entry in the book 
shows, Mrs. Madsen, from the point of view 
of bookkeeping¥ 
.A. I haven't seen this before, and I don't under-
stand it as far as I can recollect at all. 
Q. Do you understand the purpose of keeping 
an account between you and the Madsonia 
Realty Company¥ 
MR. BURTON: If the Court please, that 
is immaterial. She's answered she doesn't 
have any understanding. 
THE COURT': Let's tell her that that 
represents on the books that the Madsonia 
was giving her credit for whatever that item 
shows. 
MR. BURTON: I don't know that that 
shows that, Judge. 
THE COURT : Well, if it is in the right-
hand side, I will tell you that it does; help 
your education in accounting matters. That 
is what it is if it is on the right side. Would 
that help you now, Mrs. Madsen, if you knew 
that item represented some credit to your 
account, either where you or someone else 
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had paid or some credit had been given fo'r 
some loan like that~ Would that help you 
to remember 1 
A. I can't recall this. 
THE COURT: All right.'' (R. 193-195) 
At page -± 7 of appellants' brief it is stated: 
''It is ,clear that :Mrs. Madsen knew nothing 
of the alleged 1937 transaction between her hus-
band and the corporation, and it is not questioned 
and cannot be that Mrs. Madsen did not know 
that the consideration all went to the corporation 
instead of to her.'' 
The consideration last spoken of is the money paid 
by the Petersons. It is immaterial that she knew or 
did not know what became of this money as Madsonia 
Realty Company had bought and paid for the prope-rty 
and in turn sold the property to Mr. and Mrs. Peterson. 
However, she obviously did not expect any of the 
purchase price, as the down-payment of $4,000 and 
monthly payments for a period of two years all went 
to the corporation before her husband's death. There 
is no suggestion that she ever questioned any of such 
payments or made inquiry with regard thereto in the 
lifetime of R. W. :Madsen. 
While it is likewise immaterial, there is affirmative 
evidence which indicates Mrs. Madsen may have known 
of the 1937 trans acton: We call attention to the entries 
on the ledger sheet of R. W. Madsen with the Madsonia 
Realty Company wherein LaReta C. Madsen received 
certain specific money. One item of $1,187.50 dated 
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March 29, 1937, is a part of the proceeds of the sale. 
Her testimony that she received nothing from Madsonia 
Realty Company except that she "borrowed" money is 
completely contradicted by the record. (See Exhibit F. 
set forth at P.P. 42-43, supra.) 
Appellants state at page 48: 
''The record indicates that Mrs. Madsen be-
lieved all of the money from the sale of the home 
at 667 East 1st South went into the joint bank 
account that she and her husband had at the Utah 
8tate National Bank (R. 202-203)." 
This statement is directly in conflict with the record. 
·The testimony is as follows: 
'' Q. Mrs. Madsen, do you recall that on an exam-
ination where you were the witness in this 
court, another division of this court, that we 
discussed the joint bank account between you 
and your husband in what was the Utah State 
National Bank of approximately $21,000.00, 
that you stated that your recollection was that 
part of the money from the sale of the Mad-
sen home at 667 East First South went into 
that account~ 
MR. BURTON: We object to that as 
not being the statement that was made. 
THE COURT : The objection is ·over-
ruled. You may answer if you made that 
statement. 
A. I did not make that statement as far as I 
remember. 
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Q. Well, how well do you remember, Mrs. Mad-
sen! Do you want to say that you did not 
make that statement? 
A. I am quite positive I did not make that 'State-
ment." (R. 202) 
It was our intention to recall to Mrs. Madsen's 
memory a statement that she had made to the effect that 
a part of the $21,000 in a joint bank account (which 
she has withdrawn for herself) was made up in part 
from the proceeds of the sale of this particular property. 
Instead of testifying that she thought the money went 
into the joint bank account, she stated, "I am quite 
positive I did not make that statement." Such answer 
certainly does not show that she thought the money from 
the home went into the joint bank account. While the 
record is clear that the money from the sale to Petersons 
in 1946 went to Madsonia Realty Company, the money on 
the sale in 1937 to Madsonia Realty Company went to 
the account of R. W. Madsen, and ~part of it went through 
his account to the account of Mrs. Madsen. 
None ·of the authorities cited by appellants with re-
gard to the .claim of fraud are in point. In the case of 
Nissen vs. Nissen Trampoline Co., 39 N.W. 2nd 92, 
cited at page 50, the husband affirmatively represented 
the documents to be deeds of the corporation when they 
were in fact conveyances to the corporation. As appears 
by appellants' own statement, the case of K ratli vs. 
Booth, 191 N.E. 180, 99 Ind. App. 178, was one of affirma-
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tive fraudulent representations. The same is true of the 
case of Stokes vs. Stokes, 196 N.Y.S. 184, 119 N.Y. 
Misc. 168, cited at page 56. 
At page 58 appellants further state: 
''She expected that he was going to get the 
money under the Peterson contract.'' 
We ask appellants to point out in the record where 
there is anything to support such a statement. She and 
her counsel seem to be considerably confused as to 
whether it was he or she that was to be paid. At page 
47 they state: 
''It is not questioned and cannot he that Mrs. 
Madsen did not know that the consideration all 
went to the corporation instead of to her." 
We submit that as in the case of sales generally by 
a husband of lands owned by him, Mrs. Madsen simply 
signed the contract at the request of her husband, asking 
nothing and expecting nothing, well knowing that her 
husband had and would amply provide for her. 
POINT NO.7 
LARETA C. MADSEN IS ESTOPPED, BY CLAIMING 
THE BENEFITS OF THE WILL, FROM ASSERTING ANY 
DOWER RIGHT IN THIS PARTICULAR PIECE OF REALTY. 
The will of R. W. Madsen and the codicil thereto is 
attached to plaintiff's reply (R. 28 to 33, inclusive). 
This will and codicil was admitted in evidence (R. 161). 
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of stock in Madsonia were given by the testator to his 
two sons on the 1st day of July 1931. 'The testator then 
bequeathed the specific stock to his sons in the event 
that such gift should be held invalid. The will provides : 
''Irrespective of the foregoing and to the end 
my sons shall have and own all of the shares of 
said Madsonia Realty Company, I hereby devise 
and bequeath to them equally all shares which I 
may own or have any interest in in said company 
at the time of my death.'' 
The testator further provides that his wife shall 
take 'One-third of his real estate by operation of law and 
that the remaining two-thirds shall go to his sons in 
equal shares (Para. 5, R. 29). All of the personal prop-
erty is given two-thirds to his sons, Richard W. Madsen, 
Jr., and Francis A. Madsen, and the remaining one-third 
to his wife, LaReta C. Madsen (Para. 7, R. 30). By his 
codicil the testator subsequently gave his Cottonwood 
home, together with all furnishings, and certain specifi~ 
furnishings at the Hotel Utah to his wife (see codicil, 
R. 32 and 33). His widow, therefore, receives more than 
one-third of his estate, which estate is approximately a 
half million dollars (R. 204). Nevertheless, the will is 
clear that the deceased intended his sons to have Mad-
sonia, as he bequeathed them the stock in the event the 
gift should he held incomplete. The testator's intention 
necessarily includes all of the assets whi!ch he per-
sonally had entered on the books of the corporation. 
It is clear, therefore, that the decedent intended that 
the Peterson property or the proceeds from the sale 
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of the Peterson property would belong to his sons. La-
Reta C. Madsen has irrevocably accepted the benefits of 
the will. See the pre-trial statement (R. 37, 101) . .Should 
LaReta C. Madsen succeed in any of her contentions that 
she is entitled to a one-third interest in the Peterson 
property or any portion of the purchase price, then to 
that exent she defeats the clear intent of the testator 
as expressed in the will, the benefits of which she has 
accepted. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the trial ~court did not err in its 
holding that Madsonia Realty Company is entitled to a 
deed from the executor; that the right of the plaintiff to 
such deed is not barred by the statute of limitations; that 
LaReta C. Madsen, the widow, has released her statu-
tory dower interest in the property; that such release was 
not procured by fraud, and that LaReta C. Madsen is 
further estopped from claiming dower in this particular 
property because she has accepted the benefits of the 
will. 
We further submit that the trial court should have 
ordered and this court should now require the trial court 
to order that LaReta C. Madsen execute a deed ~conveying 
the Peterson property to Madsonia Realty Company, 
this for the purpose of preventing any possible future 
litigation upon matters which have been adjudicated 
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herein. We also suggest that should this court reverse 
the trial court in its order that the executor execute a 
deed to Madsonia Realty Company, that as an alter-
native it order the trial court to enter a decree quieting 
title against said executor and the estate of Richard W. 
Madsen, deceased (see our Point No.2). 
RespEftfully submitted, 
CHENEY, MARR, WILKINS: & 
CANNON, 
.Attto,rneys jorr Resppndent 
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